Abstract

AbstractAdversarial risk analysis (ARA) is a relatively new area of research that informs decision‐making when facing intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes. It is a decision‐theoretic alternative to game theory. ARA enables an analyst to express her Bayesian beliefs about an opponent's utilities, capabilities, probabilities, and the type of strategic calculations that the opponent is using to make his decision. Within that framework, the analyst then solves the problem from the perspective of the opponent. This calculation produces a distribution over the actions of the opponent that permits the analyst to maximize her expected utility. This review covers conceptual, modeling, computational, and applied issues in ARA as well as interesting open research issues.This article is categorized under: Statistical and Graphical Methods of Data Analysis > Bayesian Methods and Theory Applications of Computational Statistics > Defense and National Security

Highlights

  • Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) guides decision-making when there are intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes

  • This provides a distribution over the actions of the opponent that enables her to maximize her expected utility, accounting for the uncertainty she has about the opponent

  • Game theory is the standard approach to adversarial reasoning, and it has been applied, among many other areas, in politics (Brams, 2011), biology (Hammerstein and Selten, 1994), economics (Samuelson, 2016), social sciences (Shubik, 1982) and cybersecurity (Shiva et al, 2010)

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Summary

Introduction

Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) guides decision-making when there are intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes It is a decision-theoretic alternative to classical game theory that uses Bayesian subjective distributions to model the goals, resources, beliefs, and reasoning of the opponent. Within this framework, the analyst solves the problem from the perspective of her opponent while placing subjective probability distributions on all unknown quantities. This reflects the fact that the analyst does not know how her opponent is making his decision. Perhaps he is a game theorist and seeks an equilibrium solution. The decision-theoretic approach sidesteps some of the common criticisms of game theory

Auctions
ARA in general
Basic concepts in ARA
Simultaneous defend-attack games
Sequential defend-attack games
Game Theory and ARA
Further topics
Facing adversaries with other rationalities
Facing more than one adversary
Facing more complex interactions
An ARA computational pipeline
Applications
Conclusions
Full Text
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