Abstract

Automatic speech recognition (ASR) has been widely and commercially employed in health care, autonomous vehicles, and finance. Yet, recent studies have shown that universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) pose a serious threat to white-box ASR systems, when the adversary has access to the target model. Until now, the impacts of such a threat on commercial systems are still open since their models are not publicly available. To understand the security weakness in the practical black-box setting, this paper introduces the first <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">zero-query</i> UAP attacks, called AdvDDoS, with black-box access to ASR systems: we do not need to pay any query expense to estimate UAPs. Specifically, we craft targeted UAPs under a popular feature extractor and a local ASR model by reversing the robust target-category features, in which adversarial perturbations containing robust features are believed to have better transferability. Compared with vanilla UAPs, our UAPs incorporated with target-category features lead to better attacks against commercial ASR systems. We validate the efficacy of our AdvDDoS by launching attacks against a range of commercial ASR systems, <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">i.e</i> ., three API services (Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu), and three personal assistants (Apple Siri, iFlytek, and Google). Extensive experimental results demonstrate the superiority of AdvDDoS. For example, AdvDDoS achieves 83.26% word error rate (WER) and 53.25% success rates of attacks (SRoA) for the universal attack against Tencent ASR API, which outperforms the vanilla UAPs by up to 61.56% on WER and 11.6% on SRoA. The success of our attack sheds light on zero-query UAP attacks against Commercial ASR systems.

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