Abstract
An integrated framework to quantify the economic impacts of cyber-attacks on the U.S. airport security systems is put forth. A cyber-attack on the United States would involve complex strategic behavior by terrorists, who could invade an airport electronic system without any U.S. border or entry point. At the same time, defending entities must consider the complex processes that may cause any turmoil. The possibility of simultaneous threats from cyber-attacks makes it more difficult for defending entities to secure their airports, highlighting the need for improved and integrated inter-governmental collaboration. Collaborative networking requires close inter-governmental coordination to overcome such cyber-terrorism to protect critical infrastructure systems. Constructing a new model for strategic cyber-terror security requires a combination of competitive and cooperative game situations to develop specific strategies against cyber-terrorism. In addition, an airport shutdown would have ripple effects throughout domestic and international economies; these effects must be analyzed with a spatially disaggregate economic model. Combining competitive and cooperative game situations with an economic impact model, this study proposes the Game Theoretic National Interstate Economic Model (G-NIEMO) framework. G-NIEMO identifies which airport may be most vulnerable in the event that an airport electronic system is shut down. Using the probabilistic costs of airport closures, the model identifies the economic importance of cyber security by event location and industry type. From G-NIEMO, equilibrium strategies to protect U.S. airport systems can be developed and a general guideline for the evaluation of resource allocation can be provided to U.S. government agencies.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have