Abstract

Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) is one the most prominent air traffic surveillance technologies that emerged in recent years. It can be used not only as a complement to existing radar-based technologies to locate aircraft, but also as a replacement in areas without radar coverage. However, a major flaw in the deployment of this technology is its reliance on clear-text, open broadcast of messages, which makes it vulnerable to attackers. In this paper, we propose ADS-Bsec, a holistic framework that solves the root cause of ADS-B problems by enforcing the much needed authenticity and integrity in ADS-B messages. It does so without changing the message format, and along with a proper key exchange mechanism. In addition, our framework also leverages results from radio-location and risk-adaptive techniques in order to prevent attacks targeting ADS-B. An important characteristic of our framework is that it was mostly implemented using a test bed with actual prototype radios, which mimics as much as possible real flight conditions. As a result, our framework is a promising approach for integrating ADS-B to NextGen infrastructure in a secure and affordable fashion.

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