Adequacy and the Individuation of Ideas In Spinoza's Ethics

Abstract

Adequacy and the Individuation of Ideas In Spinoza's Ethics ROBERT BRANDOM IN THIS PAPER* I will argue that Spinoza's theory of knowledge is best understood as based on a reduction of intentional relations to causal relations. It follows from two of Spinoza's basic theses that some detailed account of intentionality is necessary to his project: that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of extended things, and that universal causal determinism governs the relations of extended things. We shall see that the concept of adequate ideas on which Spinoza bases his theory of knowledge requires intentional notions such as that some mind has an idea of (or representing) some thing. Spinoza must accordingly give an account of such relations which allow them to be translated into assertions of necessary causal relations between extended things. I explicate this reduction of intentionality using two guiding ideas--a novel interpretation of the individuation of extended modes (carried over to the attribute of thought by the psycho-physical parallelism) and an expanded version of the definition of the adequacy of ideas given by Radnor. 1 Providing such a framework enables me to interpret coherently the conatus (Spinoza's mysterious individuating principle ), the three levels of knowledge, and the relation between this ontological principle of individuation and the epistemological notion of the adequacy of ideas. Elaborating this relation culminates, in the final section, in an explication of Spinoza's doctrine of intuitive self-consciousness. I. The central notion around which Spinoza weaves his theory of knowledge is that of the adequacy of an idea to the thing of which it is the idea. The definition of an adequate idea is an idea "which, insofar as it is considered in itself, wthout relation to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.''2 An interpretation of this concept must account for the fact that it is vital to Spinoza's purpose that all ideas be adequate in the divine mind, while many are inadequate in the human mind.s The notions of error and evil, and the coherence of Spinoza's treatment of finitude depend on distinguishing adequate from inadequate ideas and explicating the relativity of that distinction to context (the mind of which the idea is a part). Considered as a problem of individuation, the adequacy of ideas will require interpretation by means of two principles. First, Spinoza must offer some principle which will tell us when we are confronted with two ideas and when we are confronted with only one (a use of "same idea" * I would like to thank Margaret Wilson, Arthur Szathmary, and Bruce Kuklick for their comments on earlier versionsof this paper. 1 Daisy Radnor, "Spinoza'sTheory of Ideas," Philosophical Review (July, 1971),338-359. 2 Eth. ii, Def. 4. All citations are from: Benedict De Spinoza, Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata, trans. R. H. M. Elwes(NewYork, 1960),except as otherwisenoted. 8 Eth. fi, 28, Dem. [147] 148 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY which disregards context). Second, he must offer some principle whereby we can distinguish the various contexts of a single idea in which it is adequate or inadequate. This principle would individuate more finely than the first, making distinctions ignored by that principle (distinguishing ideas-in-a-context, rather than ideas simpliciter). Nevertheless , it is clear that we cannot determine the circumstances under which an idea is adequate unless we can distinguish one idea from a group of related ones. Ideas are modes of substance conceived under the attribute of thought,4 and are hence identical with their objects, which are those same modes, conceived under the attribute of extension. Spinoza individuates substance into modes which may then be conceived under any of an infinite number of attributes (though only thought and extension are available to human beings). Each extended thing is thus the object of an idea. It is clear that this line of thought offers no convenient handle by which we may grasp the stricter individuation according to adequacy (describing the conditions under which one and the same idea can be adequate or inadequate to that thing "of" which it is the idea).5...