Adaptive rock-paper-scissors game enhances eco-evolutionary performance at cost of dynamic stability

Abstract

The rock-paper-scissors (RPS) game is a classic model for exploring the performance of how multiple strategies interact and evolve over time. The classic RPS game assumes a fixed benefit and cost for each strategy against another one when two players meet, while its evolutionary game considers the frequency dynamics of the three strategies with each's fitness influenced by its net payoff. This may not reflect the complexity of real-world scenarios as strategies can co-adapt with each other. We introduce an adaptive RPS game that captures the dynamics of strategy densities with trait-mediated payoffs, and the adaptive dynamics of coevolving traits via incremental mutations leading to adaptively evolving payoffs. Results show that the adaptive RPS game approaches a steady state of strategy density, if any, faster than the evolutionary RPS game. The stable coexistence of all strategies in the evolutionary game can be easily destabilized in the adaptive game. Strategies that are allowed to adaptively change their traits also performed better and achieved greater strategy densities than those fixed strategies in the adaptive game. The coevolving strategies in the adaptive RPS game exhibit complex and diverse attractors in the trait space, sensitive to both initial conditions and model parameters, but exhibiting positive payoffs with greater benefits than costs. These findings highlight how adaptive games enhance strategy performance by sacrificing eco-evolutionary dynamic stability.