Adaptive preferences in political philosophy

Abstract

AbstractThe concept of adaptive preferences is supposed to explain how and why victims of injustice might come to endorse their own oppression, and to provide political philosophers with a tool for objecting to that oppression even when its victims do not. Critics, however, argue that using the concept of adaptive preferences further harms the victims of injustice, by denying them the respect owed to moral agents and/or the opportunity to direct the course of their own lives. After canvassing this debate, I consider one proposal for retaining the concept as a helpful political tool while avoiding the harms that detractors point to. This proposal allows us to make different well‐being judgments about adaptive preferences before and after they have been formed. I conclude by considering the parallel literature on adaptive preferences and disability, noting the possible short‐comings of the proposal in that case, and suggesting a variety of ways for moving forward.