Abstract

This chapter examines the theory of moral obligation presented by Robert Adams in Finite and Infinite Goods. The theory holds, quite plausibly, that obligations are requirements which arise within the context of social relationships. It also holds, more controversially, that genuinely moral obligations are requirements resulting from the commands of a loving God. The advantage Adams sees in introducing the notion of a loving God into the theory is that doing so rules out the possibility that certain sorts of horrendous evils, including wanton cruelties, could turn out, according to the theory, to be morally obligatory. This advantage obtains, however, only if God's love is taken to be unlike that of the jealous, strongly preferential sort apparently attributed to God in many biblical passages. Adams does not adequately explain why he identifies the God posited by his theory with the God of the Old and New Testaments. Nor does he adequately explain why one should suppose that a God who conforms to Adams's conception of a perfectly loving being actually exists, given the horrendous evils there are and given the confusing biblical portrait of God as both a horror-defeater and a horror-commander. All things considered, more modest versions of the social theory of obligation appear more plausible than Adams's metaphysically extravagant version. A slightly more modest version would appeal directly to Adams's own theistic theory of excellence, without making reference to divine commands. An even more modest version would eschew the theistic commitments of Adams's ethical theory altogether. The chapter concludes by raising questions about Adams's conception of the metaphysics of morals as a discipline analogous to scientific inquiry into the natural kinds.

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