Abstract

There are two main points of view on the problem of the legal nature of documents interpreting constitutional and legal norms. One of them is that the interpretation should determine the true meaning and content of the legal norm in its essence, and not introduce any new information into the provision being clarified. Its main task is to clarify and highlight the content of existing norms. Another point of view is to recognize the normative nature of interpretive documents. The author examines whether acts of judicial interpretation can be the subject of constitutional justice, based on an analysis of the nature of the plenums of higher courts. And also, the article is devoted to some theoretical problems of determining the legal nature of the decisions of the Plenum of the Supreme Court and their role in establishing the uniformity of judicial practice.

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