Abstract
In the framework of optimal law enforcement theory, the existed literatures have analyzed the acts of selective law enforcement under the static conditions. In this paper, we use incomplete information dynamic game model to analyze the process of dynamic game between law enforcers and potential offenders. The result shows that the potential offenders can get relevant enforcement information such as the punishments intensity by observing, studying, and predicting the situations. Then they will modify their behaviors to avoid penalty based on this information. These opportunistic behaviors not only bring the inefficient allocation of resources, but also damage the credibility and justice of the law. To solve this problem, we need to introduce the public oversight mechanism and regulate the behaviors of law enforcers.
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