Action in Perception? Empirical and Philosophical Arguments against the Enactive Approach to Perception

Abstract

This paper focuses on the epistemic conditions of visual perception, ie it concentrates on the question of what kind of knowledge is required for us in order to be able to see colours and shapes as spatial properties of things. According to contemporary theories of sensory perception that follow the tradition of George Berkeley, like Alva Noe's so-called enactive approach to perception, this type of visual perception requires a certain kind of implicit practical knowledge, namely implicit sensorimotor knowledge of the way sensory stimulation varies as the perceiver moves. Two objections are presented against this central claim of the enactive approach. First, empirical evidence from psychological research on children's cognitive and motor development suggests that visual content is entirely independent of sensorimotor knowledge. Second, the enactive approach gets involved in the characteristic problems of classical sense--datum theories by introducing the extremely problematic claim that the recognition of appearances is the epistemic starting point for the perception of things and their properties.