Act-Utilitarianism and Collective Action

Abstract

In a recent note in this journal,' Gerald Barnes has argued that, on strictly utilitarian grounds, rule-utilitarianism is preferable to act-utilitarianism. In certain cases, he claims, better consequences will ensue from everyone's following rule-utilitarianism (RU) than would result from their following actutilitarianism (AU). If this can be shown, will also follow that the two theories have different implications with respect to action, a position that has been denied by, among others, R. B. Brandt and D. Lyons.2 Brandt argues that specious rule utilitarianism would necessarily adopt AU as the rule which would have the best consequences if universally followed, and Lyons produces a complex series of arguments to demonstrate the 'extensional equivalence' of the two doctrines. I want to show that Barnes's main claim is mistaken and consequently cannot constitute an objection to the equivalence thesis. Barnes aims to prove that it is not the case that, if everyone follows AU, maximum overall utility must result. Everyone's following AU is consistent with the production of considerably less than the utility they could produce by acting differently. Act-utilitarianism is antiutilitarian in a far more serious respect than RU is. He produces an example where this allegedly occurs and an explanation of how critics of RU have overlooked this possibility. As a preliminary, I will state the definitions used by Barnes: