Acquirers and financial constraints: Theory and evidence from emerging markets

Abstract

Financial crises in emerging market economies induce diverging patterns of ownership stakes and subsequent divestiture rates among domestic and foreign acquirers. We rationalize these empirical findings in a tractable model where domestic acquirers are subject to borrowing constraints. In contrast to standard fire-sale effects operating for acquisitions by foreign acquirers, acquisition patterns of domestic firms are shaped by a novel counteracting selection effect, resulting in larger acquired stakes and more persistent ownership. We present empirical evidence consistent with the model’s predictions using a large dataset of domestic and cross-border emerging market acquisitions over 1990–2007. The estimated contribution of selection effects is quantitatively significant, leading to 12% increases in stakes, 25% increases in full acquisitions, and 30% declines in divestiture rates among crisis-time domestic acquisitions. Our results demonstrate how financial crises can have both short- and long-run effects through the market for corporate control, by changing the set of acquirers and how long acquirers keep ownership.