Abstract
The aim of this article is to offer an analysis of early Russell’s theories of acquaintance and description. He tried to offer a solution to the Meinong’s problem of non-existent entities and used formal logic to develop a theory of definite descriptions which was related to the epistemological principle of acquaintance. I agree the view that the historical Russell changed some of his views but the principle of acquaintance remained “the structural core” in his philosophy. I try to argue that acquaintance is also a regulative principle in his logical atomism, even if at the first glance his main interest was another. The problem of the so called propositional constituents brings to light this hidden presupposition and reveals again his empiricist view fixed in a relational framework.
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