Achieving Compliance With the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes

Abstract

Literature has it that compliance with treaties is generally good. However, there is need for improvement to ensure that the objectives of a treaty are met. This paper recognizes that compliance with the Basel Convention on transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is low; hence, the increase in the amount of illegal trade in hazardous wastes. On this basis, this paper argues that there is need to improve the existing compliance strategy in the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of hazardous wastes by the adoption of hard (enforcement) measures as advocated by Downs and soft (managerial) measures as advocated by the Chayeses (collectively the dual approach). The efficacy of this dual approach depends on the inclusion of mechanisms such as funding, external and internal monitoring and verification, and sanctions, modeled on those adopted and applied in the Montreal Protocol, Kyoto Protocol, and CITES.