Abstract

We consider the multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WTC), where multiple legitimate users wish to have secure communication with a legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper. The exact secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region of this channel is known. Achieving this region requires users to follow a certain protocol altruistically and transmit both message-carrying and cooperative jamming signals in an optimum manner. In this paper, we consider the case when a subset of users deviate from this optimum protocol. We consider two kinds of deviation: when some of the users stop transmitting cooperative jamming signals, and when a user starts sending intentional jamming signals. For the first scenario, we investigate possible responses of the remaining users to counteract such deviation. For the second scenario, we use an extensive-form game formulation for the interactions of the deviating and well-behaving users. We prove that a deviating user can drive the s.d.o.f. to zero; however, the remaining users can exploit its intentional jamming signals as cooperative jamming signals against the eavesdropper and achieve an optimum s.d.o.f.

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