Accounting and political parties: explaining the “why” of an Italian light touch regulation (1974)

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explain the reasons why Law no. 195 of 2 May 1974, which established a system of public funding for the Italian political parties, introduced a system of controls that was light touch in nature.Design/methodology/approachThe paper integrates the theoretical framework on regulatory space, proposed by Hancher and Moran (1989), with that of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) to explain the peculiar nature of the system of controls introduced by the Law. Moreover, a set of primary and secondary sources is used to provide a full comprehension of the context, of the relationships among the actors involved in the regulatory process, and of the nature of the regulated issues.FindingsBesides showing that the nature of the output of a regulatory process can be understood as the effect of the peculiar configuration of the regulatory space in which it takes place, the study also sheds light on the role that legitimation can play with regard to the other features of the regulatory space, namely on its ability to strengthen or to limit their effects on the output of the regulatory process.Originality/valueThe paper deals with accounting and political parties which is a much underexplored topic in the field of accounting history. In addition, from a theoretical standpoint it contributes to extending the theoretical framework by Hancher and Moran (1989).