Abstract
<p>This article aims to verify whether, and to what extent, the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance (IPC SECG) has become an accountability enhancing arena through which domestic legislatures can better scrutinize the process of the European Semester. While there is a broad scholarship on the difficult institutionalization of the IPC SECG and controversies related to its operation, little has been said about its actual performance as an accountability enhancing platform, especially in the context of domestic interactions between parliaments and executives in the area of economic governance. Despite it being operational for several years, the scholarship lacks focus on the national parliaments’ perspective with regard to this Conference’s effectiveness. Against this background, drawing from comparative data obtained from questionnaires and interviews, this article addresses the above-mentioned aspects from an actor-oriented approach and delves deeper into parliamentary perceptions of the SECG Conference. Findings indicate that attendance at the SECG Conference by MPs has neither significantly affected their domestic parliamentary activity in the area of economic governance and budgetary policy, nor improved the existing domestic legislative-executive relationship in this context. The Conference’s procedural weaknesses are only one part of the problem, another being the marginalized domestic position of parliaments in the European Semester procedure.</p>
Highlights
The emergence of a series of measures designed to tighten fiscal governance and national budgeting rules across EU Member States as a result of the economic and financial crises of 2008–2012 has undermined to some extent (Fasone, 2015), the basic powers of national parliaments—their prerogative to control the domestic budgetary process and to represent their con‐ stituents’ interests during the coordination of economic policies (Crum, 2018; Jancic, 2017; Maatsch & Cooper, 2017)
The decision‐making formula involving the exchange of a series of recommendations, guide‐ lines, and reports between the Commission, the Council, and the Member States has made it difficult to locate the political source of responsibility for specific decisions
The final version of the SECG IPC Rules of Procedure agreed in Luxembourg in 2015 represents some sort of compromise between these con‐ trasting positions by stating that the body: Shall provide a framework for debate and exchange of information and best practices in implementing the provisions of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in order to strengthen cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament (EP) and con‐ tribute to ensuring democratic accountability in the area of economic governance and budgetary policy in the EU. (German Bundestag, 2015)
Summary
The emergence of a series of measures designed to tighten fiscal governance and national budgeting rules across EU Member States as a result of the economic and financial crises of 2008–2012 has undermined to some extent (Fasone, 2015), the basic powers of national parliaments—their prerogative to control the domestic budgetary process and to represent their con‐ stituents’ interests during the coordination of economic policies (Crum, 2018; Jancic, 2017; Maatsch & Cooper, 2017). The final version of the SECG IPC Rules of Procedure agreed in Luxembourg in 2015 represents some sort of compromise between these con‐ trasting positions by stating that the body: Shall provide a framework for debate and exchange of information and best practices in implementing the provisions of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in order to strengthen cooperation between national parliaments and the EP and con‐ tribute to ensuring democratic accountability in the area of economic governance and budgetary policy in the EU. In a broader institutional framework, the Regulation 1175/2011 forming part of the so‐called Six‐Pack, which complements the IPC‐related provision of Art. 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance, states that national parliaments “should be duly involved in the European Semester—in the prepa‐ ration of stability and convergence programs as well as national reform programs (NRP)—in order to increase the transparency and ownership of, and accountabil‐ ity for, the decisions taken.” In other words, for‐ mal provisions for parliamentary involvement in the post‐crisis EU governance architecture assume that inter‐ parliamentary cooperation should constitute an account‐ ability enhancing element in the areas of economic and fiscal policies
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
