Abstract
Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity is the tendency for relations between groups to be more competitive than relations between individuals. We examined whether the discontinuity effect arises in part because group members experience normative pressure to favor the ingroup (parochialism). Building on the notion that accountability enhances normative pressure, we hypothesized that the discontinuity effect would be larger when accountability is present (compared to absent). A prisoner’s dilemma game experiment supported this prediction. Specifically, intergroup (compared to interindividual) interaction activated an injunctive ingroup-favoring norm, and accountability enhanced the influence of this norm on competitive behavior.
Highlights
Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity refers to the tendency for relations between groups to be more competitive or less cooperative than relations between individuals (Insko et al, 2001, 2005, 2013)
The discontinuity effect has been studied predominantly in a prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) context involving participants from individualistic cultures (e.g., US, The Netherlands; Wildschut et al, 2001), it has been documented in non-laboratory contexts (Pemberton et al, 1996), among participants from a collectivistic culture (Japan; Takemura and Yuki, 2007), in a distributive multi-issue negotiation task (Loschelder and Trötschel, 2010), and in a context where the PDG matrix was substituted by a functionally equivalent set of rules governing the exchange of folded origami products (Schopler et al, 2001)
The ingroup-favoringnorm explanation proposes that the discontinuity effect arises in part because interindividual and intergroup interactions are governed by different norms or moral codes (Cohen et al, 2006; Wildschut and Insko, 2006)
Summary
Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity refers to the tendency for relations between groups to be more competitive or less cooperative than relations between individuals (Insko et al, 2001, 2005, 2013). Most PDG experiments contrasting interindividual and intergroup interactions have supported the discontinuity effect: interacting groups are more competitive than are interacting individuals (Wildschut et al, 2003). The ingroup-favoringnorm explanation proposes that the discontinuity effect arises in part because interindividual and intergroup interactions are governed by different norms or moral codes (Cohen et al, 2006; Wildschut and Insko, 2006). The untested assumption is that, because interindividual interactions are governed by norms of fairness and reciprocity, accountability should not increase (and might even reduce) competition between individuals, and accentuate the discontinuity effect. One strand of evidence supports the assumption that interindividual interactions are governed by norms of fairness and reciprocity, and, that accountability reduces competitive behavior (Reis and Gruzen, 1976; PrenticeDunn and Rogers, 1982). Consider the alternative possibility that accountability enforces the norm of selfinterest (rather than fairness and reciprocity) in interindividual contexts, in which case it could increase (rather than reduce) interindividual competition
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