Abstract

ABSTRACT Assuming the primacy of established patterns of bargaining over the formal ones, in transitional, unstable settings—well-known to the power-sharing systems—informal institutions can emerge as the preponderant rules of interaction. Yet, there is significant negligence in the power-sharing literature that should have been devoted to the informalities embedded in the political systems of divided societies. Filling in this gap, the paper analyses the creation, role and meaning of informal institutions in the consociational model. Using the case study of the Brčko District in Bosnia and Herzegovina and framework offered by Helmke and Levitsky (‘Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda’, Perspectives on Politics, 4, 724–740, 2004), it claims that the presence of informal-corporate institutions is crucial for the functioning of its consociational system and necessary to accommodate the existing formal-liberal ones. The detailed case study analysis brings conclusions that could extend the current understanding of the power-sharing model and tackle the debate about liberal consociationalism being the preferred version of power sharing.

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