Accessing Self-Control

Polaris Koi

doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00500-y

Abstract

Self-control is that which is enacted to align our behaviour with intentions, motives, or better judgment in the face of conflicting impulses of motives. In this paper, I ask, what explains interpersonal differences in self-control? After defending a functionalist conception of self-control, I argue that differences in self-control are analogous to differences in mobility: they are modulated by inherent traits and environmental supports and constraints in interaction. This joint effect of individual (neuro)biology and environmental factors is best understood in terms of access to self-control behaviours. I sketch an account of access as including the three criteria of means, awareness, and non-excessive effort. I further demonstrate that people with disorders such as ADHD have limited access to self-control behaviours and stand therefore at a disadvantage with regard to self-control.

Highlights

Self-control is that which is enacted1 to align our behaviour with a motivational commitment, such as an intention or better judgment, in the face of conflicting impulses of motives2
Failures of self-control have been accounted for, in some willpower theories, by reference to the ego depletion hypothesis according to which willpower involves a limited, dedicated resource that is depleted with use; this hypothesis has faced copious criticism, including due to replication issues
For the access theory of self-control, self-control is a set of practices and behaviours

Summary

Introduction

Self-control is that which is enacted to align our behaviour with a motivational commitment, such as an intention or better judgment, in the face of conflicting impulses of motives. Self-control is that which is enacted to align our behaviour with a motivational commitment, such as an intention or better judgment, in the face of conflicting impulses of motives2 It is an umbrella concept, subject to various measures that are distinct but correlated (Duckworth & Kern, 2011). To make my case for an access-based account of individual differences in selfcontrol, I must first argue for self-control as subject to multiple realizability, defined by its behavioural function rather than by the presence of any specific mental process or mechanism.

Self‐Control is a Broad Set of Behaviours

Which Self‐Control Behaviours are Accessible?

When Access is Limited

Conclusion