Abstract
The main goal of this chapter is to argue that accessibilism in epistemology is incompatible with vehicle externalism in the philosophy of mind (also known as “the extended mind thesis”). As we shall see, however, there are strong arguments for both of these positions. On the one hand, there is a compelling argument for vehicle externalism: the parity argument from Clark and Chalmers (1998). On the other hand, there is a compelling argument for accessibilism: the Moorean argument from Smithies (2012). If accessibilism is incompatible with vehicle externalism, then both arguments cannot be sound. I resolve the tension by arguing that the Moorean argument succeeds, while the parity argument fails, and hence that vehicle externalism should be rejected on broadly epistemological grounds.
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