Academic Engagement and the Outside Assignment of University Patents

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between outside assignment of university patents and academic engagement. This is a relevant topic because the outside patent assignment concerning inventions developed with the use of university resources gives rise to a loss of financial resources that a university could invest in future research or teaching activities. Drawing on agency theory, we conjecture that asymmetric information and divergent goals between the academic scientist and her employer raise the risk that patents developed in the context of direct scientist-firm relationships are commercialized through non-university channels. Besides, we hypothesize that the provision of outcome-based rewards to get university scientists involved in technology transfer and the pursuit of research partnership at the organizational level mitigate the effect of academic engagement on the external assignment of university patents. We empirically test these hypotheses drawing on both survey and archival data concerning more than 500 research projects spawning a patent application. Our analysis provides cross-country evidence on how academic engagement, formal research partnerships and incentive systems impinge upon the outside assignment of university patent.