Abstract
This chapter explores the place of Scotus in relation to medieval theories of intelligible species and phantasms (imaginative representations of cognitive objects). Scotus argues, against Henry of Ghent, that the intellect requires non-sensory representations, known as intelligible species, antecedent to any cognitive act. The chapter argues that Scotus’s reasons for this are not consistent with his mature view on the representational content of mental acts. Henry maintains that the intellect cannot be the subject of real accidents with representational content: such content is had by the soul in virtue of ’intentionally’ existing forms. But Henry posits that there are dispositional cognitions—scientific habits—that have representational content, and that these cognitions are real accidents of the intellect. According to Scotus, then, Henry contradicts himself. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the causal function and ontological status of intelligible species according to Scotus.
Published Version
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