Abstract Games of Argumentation Strategy and Game-Theoretical Argument Strength

Abstract

We define a generic notion of abstract games of argumentation strategy for (attack-only and bipolar) argumentation frameworks, which are zero-sum games whereby two players put forward sets of arguments and get a reward for their combined choices. The value of these games, in the classical game-theoretic sense, can be used to define measures of (quantitative) game-theoretic strength of arguments, which are different depending on whether either or both players have an “agenda” (i.e. an argument they want to be accepted). We show that this general scheme captures as a special instance a previous proposal in the literature (single agenda, attack-only frameworks), and seamlessly supports the definition of a spectrum of novel measures of game-theoretic strength where both players have an agenda and/or bipolar frameworks are considered. We then discuss the applicability of these instances of game-theoretic strength in different contexts and analyse their basic properties.