Absolute versus Relative Inequality

Abstract

Abstract The chapter considers the frequently made distinction between absolute and relative standards of inequality. Considering the many facets of the recent egalitarianism debate in political philosophy, the opposition between absolute and relative standards of inequality has not taken center stage. The chapter, however, reveals that this opposition sits at the heart of some of the debate’s most influential positions (David Miller, Elizabeth Anderson, Derek Parfit, Joseph Raz, Harry Frankfurt). By “absolute standards,” authors usually refer to standards whose validity or plausibility does not depend on comparison. “Relative standards,” on the other hand, depend on comparative measures to gain informational value. Whether I am considered wealthy may depend on my society’s general income level. The point of the chapter is that distinguishing between relative and absolute levels of inequality provides the conceptual means for understanding a specific kind of empathy gulf: one I label “conceptually inspired,” but which could also be taken to inspire a firm denial of relationality.