Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914

Abstract

It is generally believed that the younger Moltke altered the Schlieffen plan in 1914 by reducing the relative strength of the German right wing, but that is a myth: in proportion to the rest of his forces Moltke’s right wing was just as strong as Schlieffen’s. The real difference lay in the absolute number of troops involved in their respective plans. From his assessment of French defensive capability Schlieffen concluded that the German army would need at least 48.5 corps to succeed with an attack on France by way of Belgium, but Moltke planned to attack through Belgium with just 34 corps at his disposal in the west. The Schlieffen plan amounts to a critique of German strategy in 1914 since it clearly predicted the failure of Moltke’s underpowered invasion of France.