Absolute Discretion and the Rule of Law: Uneasy Bedfellows

Abstract

Absolute in decision-making under the Immigration Act 2009 is intended to generate administrative efficiency and balance individual and national interests. While New Zealand courts have reached a consensus that the use of absolute discretion does not create ouster clauses and Immigration New Zealand's internal instructions have also eroded the absolute nature, each of them have differed their definitions of the scope of absolute discretion over time, within the same sections and over the whole Act. This paper proposes that the uncertainty surrounding absolute discretion's precise meaning—both within and between the varying definitions provided by the Legislature, Judiciary and Executive—threatens the vital rule of law concept of legal certainty. Considering the potential encroachment of unrestrained absolute discretion on international obligations, human rights and access to information, clarity is essential. Two steps could be taken to enhance clarity, with minimal impingement on the Act's policy: removal of the descriptive absolute; and clarification, in regulations, of the mandatory considerations, recording standards and extra-legislative factors to which must be given effect within each decision made in absolute discretion.