Absolute and relative power gains among state agencies in forest-related land use politics: The Ministry of Forestry and its competitors in the REDD+ Programme and the One Map Policy in Indonesia

Abstract

More than ever, state agencies responsible for forest issues are required to balance the social, economic and environmental demands on forests in domestic and international spheres. New and often cross-cutting issues may threaten the position and power of traditional forest bureaucracies through, e.g., a redistribution of power among a number of other land-use-related state agencies. This paper analyzes the absolute and relative power of the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) in two selected policy processes originating on the international and domestic levels, namely the REDD+ Programme and the One Map Policy. Building on a behavioralist conception of power and bureaucratic politics theories, we study these processes to reveal the power dynamics between the MoF and other state bureaucracies, based mainly on documents on tasks assigned to these bureaucracies. Our results show a clear decline in the relative power of the MoF, most notably in the case of incentive and coercive power, though we also show a continuation of power resulting from dominant information. However, due to political intervention from the new president, traditional forest bureaucracy is now reclaiming most of relative power elements in these cases. We discuss the core findings and conclude that both REDD+ and the One Map Policy are likely to become effective policies only if the bureaucratic, sectoral and multi-level conflicts of interest we examine are addressed and fewer leading agencies (or one) assume responsibility for policy formulation and implementation.