Abstract
AbstractAnalytic epistemologists reach regularly for favoured ‘intuitions’. And the anti‐luck intuition (as Duncan Pritchard calls it) is possibly one of the best‐entrenched epistemological intuitions at present, seemingly guiding standard reactions to Gettier situations. But why is that intuition true (if it is)? This paper argues that the anti‐luck intuition (like the ability intuition) rests upon something even more deeply explanatory – the normality intuition. And to recognise this is to understand better what most epistemologists want from a concept of knowledge. (It also helps to explain recent epistemological reactions to lottery cases.)1
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