Able but not willing: a critical assessment of NATO’s Libya intervention

Abstract

NATO’s ostensibly ‘successful’ intervention in Libya was notable in many respects, not the least of which was that the mission occurred at all, and when it did, the majority of Alliance members had little enthusiasm to meaningfully participate. Yet when the ‘defensive’ mission that was originally envisaged to protect civilians soon became a ‘regime change’ operation, rather than withdraw their support, NATO members continued to ensure the primacy of Alliance solidarity, even though this did not translate into providing additional military assets. The result was a half-hearted air campaign that lasted for months with little change to the stalemate on the ground and with increasing political frustration at the lack of progress. Fortunately for NATO, a series of rebel military successes in mid-August that culminated in the capture of Tripoli transformed a potential ‘quagmire’ into a ‘success’. In the aftermath of Gaddafi’s fall, the official narrative about the Libya campaign has, not unsurprisingly, tended to focus on those aspects that highlighted the Alliance’s ‘flexibility’, ‘openness’, and ‘strength’.1 Where there have been ‘lessons learned’, or at least ‘lessons identified’, these have been limited to technical military matters. Overlooked in this ‘critical’ discourse are the political dynamics that shaped the military campaign. When examined through a political prism, rather than a strictly military one, the NATO campaign looks far less ‘successful’, and indeed, it will be argued that it is the political lessons that are likely to have more far reaching consequences for the future direction of the Alliance. This chapter will examine the intra-Alliance politics of NATO’s intervention, and to a lesser extent the Alliance’s relations with partner nations and the rebel forces. As NATO’s intervention was not a foregone conclusion, the chapter will begin by focusing on the debates within NATO that led to it taking the lead in Libya, to include the political compromises that were made to secure consensus, and the limits placed on the military mission. It will then analyse the varying levels of commitment made by NATO members and partners, with a focus on the limited participation ofthe United States. Related to this, the different national attitudes towards both the means to be employed and the ends to be achieved in Libya will also be assessed. For instance, some NATO members and partners chose to operate as a coalition within the Alliance, and also to conduct more sensitive operations outside the NATO framework altogether. The problem of transatlantic burden-sharing will be specifically addressed by examining NATO’s failure to secure a handful of ground-attack aircraft shortly after it took over the mission from the US-led Operation Odyssey Dawn. Another key feature of the campaign to be examined were the limited, and often indirect contacts, NATO was obliged to maintain with the rebels, and the impediments this placed on achieving a more rapid downfall of Gaddafi’s regime. The chapter will conclude with a discussion about how the political and diplomatic ‘lessons’ may influence future NATO interventions.