Abkhazia on Three Wheels

Abstract

SUKHUMI, Abkhazia?The land between Georgia and this breakaway region repre sents a tense coda to a short war and a tenu ous peace, a tribute to the fragile nature of such territories. Here, the frontier post is considered an international border by the Abkhaz and is patrolled by Abkhaz troops. Russian forces are camped nearby. After Russia and Georgia's brief war in 2008, Moscow recognized Abkhazia and South Os setia's declarations of independence. Since then, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have, with the Kremlin's support, lobbied for oth ers' recognition but have, for the most part, failed. The territories are internationally iso lated and increasingly dependent on Russia for security, hence the Russian troops. A steady stream of tired residents from Gali, an ethnic region on the Abkhaz side of the checkpoint, cross this frontier with shop ping bags filled with goods for trade. By an unfortunate confluence of geography and politics, they are caught in between. This new, postwar reality has been par ticularly damaging to Georgia. For years it claimed it was on the brink of solving inter nal conflicts that have fragmented its terri tories since the early 1990s, when South Os setia and Abkhazia were first brought under Georgian leadership. In the years before the August 2008 war, the Georgian government offered Abkhazia limitless autonomy within the framework of a national federa tion, but Abkhaz leaders refused to accept control from politicians in Tbilisi, Georgia's capital. Abkhazia and South Ossetia had been part of Georgia for most of the Soviet era, and many Georgians consider both ter ritories their own. Still, Abkhazia and South Ossetia fought for their independence in the early 1990s, and again in August 2008. Since then, leadership in Sukhumi? Abk hazia's capital?find any arrangement that might cede sovereignty to Georgia unac ceptable. Few governments acknowledge that the war has changed the political reali ties in Abkhazia and Georgia. The United States and Europe continue to support Geor gia's territorial integrity, but after spending time in Abkhazia it is clear that this ap proach is a non-starter. By continuing to isolate Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia and the rest of the world is implicitly allow ing Russia to get away with a de facto an nexation of these territories, all but guaran teeing ongoing tension and potential mili tary conflict along these political fault lines. While Georgia and Abkhazia both cling to a vision of classical sovereignty and state hood, each lacks an essential element of the necessary combination of de facto control and de jure international recognition. For Geor