Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties

Matthew Tugby

doi:10.1163/18756735-000112

Abstract

Abstract Traditionally, many arguments for realism about properties (universals or tropes) rely on a priori claims. The author argues that if we make use of an abductive principle that is commonly employed by scientific realists, a new argument for property realism can be formulated which is based firmly in scientific practice. The abductive principle says that we should believe in the existence of certain theoretical entities if they figure in the best explanation for what scientists observe. The scientific argument for property realism then says (roughly) that the best explanation for various behavioural patterns that physical scientists observe is that microscopic entities (such as electrons) instantiate stable, causally efficacious properties. After presenting the argument, the author defends it against possible objections. More generally, the article provides a case study for how science and metaphysics can work together to generate ontological claims.

Highlights

Scientific Realism, Scientific Properties and Scientific realists believe in the mind-independent existence of many of the unobservables that we find in scientific theory
The aim of this article has been to show that if one is attracted to the abductive approach to scientific entity realism, one has good prima facie reasons for accepting property realism
Among other things, such properties help to remove the apparent coincidence of distinct dispositions regularly clustering together

Summary

Introduction

It is argued that we are entitled to believe in the existence of particles like electrons and quarks because the existence of such particles provides the best explanation for the fact that, in certain experimental contexts, the observable world behaves as if particles exist. Those who abductively infer the mind-independent existence of physical entities like particles are what Brian Ellis calls ‘scientific entity realists’, and its proponents include Smart (1963), Cartwright (1983), Devitt (1997) and Ellis himself (1987). We can give good explanations of the behaviour and characteristics of observed entities, behaviour and characteristics which would otherwise remain completely inexplicable

Objectives

Conclusion