Abatement, Care, and Compliance by Firms in Financial Distress

Abstract

We examine precautionary behavior, specifically compliance with environmental regulations, pollution abatement, and care spending, by firms facing two sources of insolvency risk. If poor profit or a liability triggers insolvency, then the firm forgoes a profitable future. The behavioral implications of this survival motive vary across firms. Firms for whom the principal insolvency risk is liability-related now choose precaution above the level chosen by the solvent firm. For firms whose primary insolvency risk is profit-related, the survival motive reinforces incentives for care below the solvent benchmark arising from the familiar judgment-proof effect. We also characterize how insolvency risks affect incentives to conceal adverse events linked to these choices, such as an accident or a regulatory violation. An understanding of these incentives is particularly important during recessionary periods when firms struggle to survive the downturn.