Abandoning Non-State Allies: Not a Matter of Strategy

Abstract

Generation of effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism techniques has been placed at the top of the scholarly agenda in the aftermath of September 11. Dissuading state support of terrorist groups and insurgency movements is one of the vital components of an effective counterinsurgency or counterterrorism techniques. While the scholars have been motivated by exploring the micro-level determinants of insurgency and terrorism, since they thought that it is the key to deal with insurgent and terrorist violence in the long run, they have long undermined the role of “state” on the generation and endurance of insurgency and terrorist movements. Nevertheless, it is essential to distinguish between the conditions that lead states to support such groups as a foreign policy instrument and those that make them abandon these groups. I argue that although states are motivated by strategic and ideational interests in initiating their support of certain groups, the termination of support is driven by rather practical and imminent concerns. States are more likely to terminate their support of a group if they realize that it poses a threat to domestic stability and survival of leaders. In addition, there are multiple modes of support termination, target pressures, international pressures, leadership or regime change in the supporter, groups’ change of their supporters, and target-supporter coordination. Each is driven by different factors. Two sets of empirical analyses, multinomial logit and Cox proportional hazard analyses have been conducted on original data collected for the period between 1945 and 2001. The findings support the arguments with respect to imminent gains and the presence of multiple modes of termination.