Abstract
The first part of this essay concerns the question whose attributions of normative meaning are relevant for the existence of legal systems: those of legal practitioners or those of legal scholars. The essay argues that since the effectiveness of a legal order is the effectiveness of applied and observed norms, legal positivist must regard the attributions of meaning by practitioners as authoritative. Upon closer inspection, however, it turns out that these attributions originate from practices of knowing the law that reflect critically on their own point. The second part of the essay concerns the role of legal philosophy and rejects the view that regards it as a foundational discipline. Rather, it is a mode of self-reflection that permits the law to emancipate itself from the strictures of money and power.
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