A Wittgensteinian Approach to Interreligious Disagreements: Descriptive and Normative Investigations

Abstract

From examining the work of Lindbeck, Tracy, and Burrell, we have learned valuable lessons, both in terms of interpreting Wittgenstein theologically as well as in terms of the possibilities of applying a (more or less) Wittgensteinian approach in theology to the topics such as interreligious incommensurability, (un)translatability, dialogue, communication, and disagreement. In this chapter, my focus will narrow down somewhat: I will present my perspective on interreligious disagreement which builds on the critical explorations in previous chapters but goes a step further. From a Wittgensteinian perspective—that is, according to my interpretation of Wittgenstein on religion outlined in previous chapters, especially in Chap. 2—I want to shed light on the aspects of interreligious disagreement which were not addressed at any length by Lindbeck, Tracy, and Burrell.