Abstract
ABSTRACT Cooperation on environmental issues is often perceived as a zero-sum game, where individual gains must be sacrificed for collective benefits. This paper offers a the oretical solution that balances individual and collective benefits to foster joint environmental action. Drawing on game theory and insights from the inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) literature, the paper explores how to solve environmental problems that present a collective action dilemma. It aligns with proponents of gain framing for environmental action and introduces the concept of ‘exogenous personalised gains’ in driving environmental action. It demonstrates that if the right exogenous personalised gains are leveraged, joint environmental actions are more likely.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
