A Window on How China Behaves as a Rising Power

Abstract

As China emerges as a global economic and military power, much of the Western world watches with apprehension. Mainstream (realist) international relations (IR) theory, reflecting the experience of the Westphalian system of states, divines that any rising power is prone to violence. All previous rising powers—from Britain following the Industrial Revolution, Napoleonic France, post-Meiji Japan, Germany after the Bismarckian wars and unification, to the Soviet Union after Stalin—were first-time upstarts. Their belligerent records lend reassuring credence to realist theory. But, China is not a first-time upstart. For a thousand years before 1800, China was the world's largest economy and, hence, the greatest power (Frank 1998: 52–130). There is no precedent in Westphalian history that will serve as a guide on whether a nation on its second ascent will behave any differently. Taylor Fravel's study of China's response to 23 territorial disputes with neighboring states offers, in effect, a preview of what is likely to happen when China re-emerges as a power to be reckoned with.