A White-box Implementation of SM4 with Self-equivalence Encoding

Abstract

Abstract White-box implementation can ensure the security of cryptographic algorithm in white-box attack environment without changing the inputs and outputs of the original algorithm. Most existing white-box implementations construct a series of lookup tables to protect the key. However, with the development of white-box attack techniques, many white-box implementations have been proved to be insecure. In this paper, a new white-box implementation of SM4 is proposed, which is based on an equivalent partial SPN structure of the SM4 algorithm. Our implementation includes three types of table lookup operations and XOR operations. The round keys are obfuscated with the self-equivalences of the S-box and random affine encodings. Security analysis shows that our implementation can resist BGE-type attack, the attack based on affine equivalence algorithm, the structure attack, the collision attack and differential computational analysis. Furthermore, our scheme requires 8.125 MB of memory.