A Whale of a Blindspot: The “Effectiveness” of Bribes, Threats, and Socialization in the International Whaling Commission

Abstract

This paper contributes to broader efforts to de-center and historicize IR theory by bringing into question dominant narratives about developing country behavior at the International Whaling Commission (IWC). This literature either neglects, or actively erases any possibility of developing country agency; different blindspots work to the same effect, whereby developing country behavior is assumed rather than investigated, and behavioral change, such as a decision to join the IWC, vote a certain way, or abide by the whaling moratorium, is driven mostly by exogenous factors—threats, bribes, and persuasion. If a developing country choosing a pro-whaling stance is evidence of vote-buying, and an anti-whaling stance is evidence of coercion or socialization, then great power agency is assumed to exist and matter without being demonstrated—and the possibility of agency is denied to most of the world. I use the case of Brazil, the last country to give up whaling in the American continent, to de-center and historicize important whaling-related decisions made from the 1950s–1990s. Brazil voted against the commercial whaling moratorium in 1982 but has since given up whaling and become a leader in whale conservation. The empirical analysis not only finds scant support for the dominant explanations, but it also challenges them on several grounds—and thus underscores the need for theoretical lenses that allow for developing countries’ agencies to be acknowledged. More than contributing to inclusive scholarship, taking alternative perspectives seriously is imperative for more just conservation practice, and more legitimate global governance.