Abstract
Max Weber constructed ideal types highlighting economic, social, political, or other values in objects of inquiry to utilize these ideal types in empirical studies. In this article, Weber’s ideal type, the ideal type of Herrschaft—“domination”—is adapted first to examine New Zealand, and using New Zealand as baseline to next examine Finland. The asymmetric comparative design is applied along three dimensions of domination. In an economic dimension, New Zealand highlights ways of countering threats of volatility and stagnation by means of retrenchment and fiscal austerity—characteristics also found in Finland. In a continuum from residual welfare for the worst-off to universal welfare for all in the social dimension, New Zealand is situated closer to the former and Finland the latter end. In the political dimension, dismantling concentrations of political power but retaining capacity at the “center of government” receives emphasis in New Zealand, and counterparts can be also found in Finland.
Highlights
It might appear that from among the world’s prosperous democracies, those with large populations present the models and the others hardly more than emulate
We find a definite connection of the economic dimension examined with Max Weber’s ideal type of Herrschaft/ domination in its subtype with legitimation on economically rational grounds
A contribution has been sought from applying methodological ideas of a classical author without allowing for anachronisms—especially projections between present and past theories
Summary
It might appear that from among the world’s prosperous democracies, those with large populations present the models and the others hardly more than emulate. Research Question 2: What characterizes Finland in the economic, social, and political dimensions of Herrschaft/ domination with special reference to values that the examination of New Zealand pinpoints?. In 2012, the GDP share of taxes was 33.0% in New Zealand and 42.8 in Finland, whereas the OECD average was 33.7 (OECD, 2015) Despite these differences, both New Zealand’s and Finland’s tax reforms reveal subscription to analogous economic values. The latter country put an end to its national monetary policies in 1991 with unilateral pegging of its currency to the currency unit of the evolving EU (Kiander & Vartia, 2011), finalized once Finland joined the euro area in 2002. The presidential role in presenting government legal proposals to parliament
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