A War Without End

Abstract

contend. Even if some officials believed they were waging war to stop Iraq from arming itself with nuclear weapons or to defeat the terrorists abroad before they attack us at home, a close reading of prewar intelligence on Iraq and what is now known about the administration's internal deliberations cast doubt on those aims. Iraq was no war for oil either. Nor was it undertaken to acquire bases, contain Iran, impose democracy on the Middle East, or dash hopes for Israeli-Palestinian peace, however much some war hawks may have wished it would. To the president and his top advisers, the September 1 1 attack underscored U.S. weakness and vulnerability at home and abroad. Warned that al Qaeda could be planning further attacks and that the United States was not well prepared to stop them, they opted to display power for domestic and foreign audiences. If that was their purpose, the war in Iraq is now pointless. Now Washington is preoccupied with how to end that war, and the domestic debate is just as muddled and self-absorbed as was the debate to start it. Much of the current discussion misunderstands the nature of