A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea William Allison A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea. William Johnston. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003. Pp. xx, 426, illus. $45.00 The Korean War is finally receiving the scholarly attention it deserves, as historians reassess the so-called forgotten war and publishers capitalize on newfound interest in the conflict. So often it has been the American experience that has received the more intensive examination, with the 'other' United Nations participants, mainly Commonwealth and Turkish forces, providing the focus for an article here and a monograph there. Moreover, the Korean War frequently gets cursory treatment as an appendix to the early Cold War. Contextually, this has some merit, but even this is changing, as more historians are examining the conflict on its own merits at both the macro and micro levels. William Strueck's Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton University Press, 2002) and William Earl Hamburger's Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-Ni (Texas A&M University Press, 2003) are respectively representative of the broad strategic focus versus the narrow tactical study. What has been missing from this recent scholarship, however, is a book that provides the singular combination of strategic context and tactical detail that dissects a national experience in this war to a degree that offers fresh interpretation and clear lessons in readable prose. William Johnston, a historian with the Directorate of History and Heritage at the Canadian Department of National Defence, has written just such a book. Despite its somewhat misleading title, which leads one to think the book is solely about Canadian small unit tactics, Johnston has produced a work of breadth and depth that describes the Canadian experience in Korea. Johnston skilfully and lucidly guides the reader in and out of deep mineshafts of detail while always maintaining a solid safety line to the broad, contextual surface. His purpose is to tell the Canadian experience in the Korean War and to correct what he sees as mistakes in previous interpretations of this experience. For Canada, the war was so different from its Second World War experience, yet veterans of that conflict had an invaluable impact on how Canada fought in Korea. Johnston's thesis is that there were three distinct periods of experience [End Page 805] for Canadian forces in Korea, each fashioned by the three commanders and the three forces sent to Korea. The main punch of this thesis is that leadership and tactical differences influenced this experience, and thus shaped Canada's role in Korea. The Canadian response to the North Korean invasion south of the 38th parallel was at first tentative, but a sense of obligation to the young United Nations and public opinion that demanded action on this obligation convinced Canada to send a brigade to Korea. The first brigade to go over was a volunteer force drawn from a large pool containing many veterans of the Second World War. Called the Canadian Army Special Force, 25th Brigade's 2nd battalions were commanded by the dynamic, courageous, and tactically insightful Brigadier John M. Rockingham. A very successful Second World War combat leader, Rockingham utilized officer and NCO experience to train Special Force for combat in Korea. Although they were considered by some historians as a mob of unruly and undisciplined adventurers, Johnston maintains that nothing could be farther from the truth. He suggests, rather, that Rockingham's unit may have been one of the best prepared forces Canada has ever sent into the field. Special Force was a highly trained, highly skilled unit that served well in the unique circumstances of Korea. Basically fighting a holding action, Rockingham used active and aggressive patrols to limit Chinese activity in the Canadian sector. Special Force knew the terrain, had good reconnaissance, and was thus able to effectively counter many Chinese raids and conduct equally effective raids on their own. The success of this tactic came in relatively low casualty rates, considering the numerous Chinese attacks thrown against them, and was in large part successful because of Rockingham's emphasis on training and experience, as well as the...