Abstract

AbstractWe explore how the contract values of the various stakeholders of a typical US state civil servants pension fund are affected under the continuation of current policies and under alternative policies, such as changes in contribution, indexation and investment allocation policies. We find that all participant cohorts derive a substantial net benefit from the current pension contract, while all tax-paying cohorts make substantial contributions. The shift in value from tax payers to participants can be reduced substantially by having the latter make larger contributions or making indexation less generous. Under our baseline calibration, and continuation of existing policies, the chances are high that the fund's assets get depleted in the coming decades.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.