Abstract

The linkable ring signature supporting stealth addresses (SALRS) is a recently proposed cryptographic primitive, which is designed to comprehensively address the soundness and privacy requirements associated with concealing the identities of both the payer and payee in cryptocurrency transactions. However, concerns regarding the scalability of SALRS have been underexplored. This becomes notably pertinent in intricate blockchain systems where multiple cryptographic primitives operate concurrently. To bridge this gap, our work revisited and formalized the ideal functionality of SALRS within the universal composability (UC) model. This encapsulates all correctness, soundness, and privacy considerations. Moreover, we established that the newly proposed UC-security property for SALRS is equivalent to the concurrent satisfaction of signer-unlinkability, signer-non-slanderability, signer-anonymity, and master-public-key-unlinkability. These properties represent the four crucial game-based security aspects of SALRS. This result ensures the ongoing security of previously presented SALRS constructions within the UC framework. It also underscores their adaptability for seamless integration with other UC-secure primitives in complex blockchain systems.

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