Abstract
Since the advent of a post-structuralist ethos, the assertion of a notion of truth, conceived as a universal, fixed and absolute point d’appui from which a given social order could be evaluated as ideological or non-i deological, seems no longer possible. As Rorty (1991: xxxix) has pointed out, ‘[we can now] see ourselves as never encountering reality except under a chosen description as … making worlds rather than finding them?’ (ibid.). Ultimately, the debate of the theory of ideology seems to be trapped either in the study of the operation of ideologies a la Freeden, a somewhat defensive ‘anti-closed’ notion of ideology a la Laclau, or in an abandonment of the notion of ideology altogether a la Foucault. However, we could still legitimately ask whether or not an inevitable condition of the ‘post-modern world’, that is, a world deprived of a manifest intrinsic meaning, is the renouncement of the assumption of a certain notion of a universal truth for a critique of ideology.
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