A Unified Security Analysis of Two-Phase Key Exchange Protocols in TPM 2.0

Abstract

The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) version 2.0 provides an authenticated key exchange functionality by a single key exchange primitive, which can be called to implement three key exchange protocols (denoted as two-phase key exchange protocols in TPM 2.0): the Full Unified Model, the MQV, and the SM2 key exchange protocols. However, some vulnerabilities have been found in all of these protocols. Fortunately, it seems that protections provided by the TPM can deal with vulnerabilities of these protocols. This paper investigates whether the TPM key exchange primitive provides a secure key exchange functionality under protections of the TPM. We first perform an informal analysis of the TPM key exchange primitive which helps us to model in a precise way. Then we formally analyze the TPM key exchange primitive in a security model for AKE, based on which all the protocols adopted by TPM 2.0 can be analyzed in a unified way. Our analysis indicates under what conditions the TPM 2.0 can provide a provable secure key exchange functionality. In the end, we give suggestions on how to leverage the TPM key exchange primitive properly, and suggestions on how to improve the security of current TPM key exchange primitive to enable its wide use in practice.