Abstract
AbstractModularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory‐of‐mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory‐theory’ account of theory‐of‐mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain‐general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the progressive alignment of relational structure that occurs as a result of structural‐comparison. The article also explores the implications of the proposed account for Fodor's puzzle of conceptual learning.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
