A typology of explicative models

Abstract

This paper identifies and discusses the variety of approaches we use to explain the events and acts which comprise the socio-organizational phenomena we strive to understand. In the past few years a number of thoughtful discussions have been published on the differences and similarities of the various methods of explanation. The discussion has been stimulated in part by the limitations of traditional causal determinism, (as used in the physical sciences) for explaining phenomena encountered in both the biological and social sciences. By and large, however, little attempt has been made to create typologies of the different explanatory approaches. Notable exceptions are Aristotle (4 types of causes), MacIver (6 types of causation) and Bunge (causal, semi-causal and a-causal determinism). From discussions of three different approaches, namely causal, teleological and gestaltic explanations, (together with their derivatives and their hybrids), a typology is presented. The basis of the typology is the temporal relationship between the events to be explained (the explicandum) and the events which are employed as part of the explanation (the explicans events). The purpose of the article is to draw attention to the almost paradoxical contrast between the future-oriented nature of what practicing managers actually do, and the past-oriented nature of most of our scientific theories. It is suggested that past-oriented explanations may be intrinsically incapable of producing viable theories of social/organizational change.